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CONFLICT OF LAWS-MULTISTATE TORTS--ARKANSAS RE-
LIES ON CHOICE-INFLUENCING CONSIDERATIONS AND THE "BET-
TER RULE OF LAW." Schlemmer v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co.,
292 Ark. 344, 730 S.W.2d 217 (1987).
In May of 1981, Donna Schlemmer, a resident of Memphis, Ten-
nessee, drove her car to Rochelle Smith's home in West Memphis,
Arkansas. After deciding to attend a party, the pair got into an unin-
sured vehicle belonging to Smith's sister. Smith drove the car to an-
other location in West Memphis. On the way home from the party,
Smith lost control of the car. In the resulting accident, Schlemmer
sustained injuries.
Schlemmer's stepfather maintained uninsured motor vehicle cov-
erage through Fireman's Fund Insurance Company. Schlemmer filed
suit in Arkansas against the insurance company, seeking compensa-
tion for her injuries. The defendant insurance company filed a motion
for summary judgment in which it contended that her stepfather's
policy did not cover Schlemmer, and, alternatively, that the Arkansas
guest statute' barred recovery.
The Crittenden County Circuit Court held that the Arkansas
guest statute barred recovery because Smith was not driving in willful
and wanton disregard of the rights of others. The trial court did not
reach the issue of whether the plaintiff was a covered person under the
terms of the insurance policy.
The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed. The court held that
Tennessee law, rather than Arkansas law, applied to the tort phase of
the suit because Tennessee law, which contains no guest statute,2 was
the better rule of law. The court remanded the case for a determina-
tion of whether the insurance policy covered the plaintiff. Schlemmer
v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 292 Ark. 344, 730 S.W.2d 217
(1987).
The term "conflict of laws" applies to a situation in which two or
1. Act of February 20, 1935, No. 61, §§ 1 & 2, 1935 Ark. Acts 138; Act of March 21,
1935, No. 179, § 1, 1935 Ark. Acts 481; Act of March 30, 1959, No. 453, § 15, 1959 Ark. Acts
1805 (repealed 1983). The statute provided that a guest shall not have a cause of action against
the owner or operator of a vehicle unless the vehicle was operated in willful and wanton disre-
gard of the rights of others.
2. Absent a guest statute, a plaintiff need only show ordinary negligence in order to
recover for injuries suffered while a guest in an automobile. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 34, at 215 (5th ed. 1984).
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more jurisdictions have an interest in a particular case.3 When the
substantive laws of the interested states differ, courts must choose
which law should apply to the case. The question of which law to
apply is a branch of conflict of laws termed "choice of law." 4
States are free to develop their choice of law rules, subject to the
Federal Constitution and federal laws derived from it.' In formulat-
ing choice of law rules, courts in the various states rely on several
theories.6 In recent choice of law cases, courts cited the following
theories as influential authority for their decisions: the center of grav-
ity approach, the governmental interest analysis, the most significant
relationship test from the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws,
and choice-influencing considerations.7 Conflict of laws scholars con-
sider these theories "modern" because they appeared after the original
Restatement of Conflict of Laws. Some states continue to follow the
traditional approach of the First Restatement9 while others use a
combination of modern theories.
The first modern theory to appear was called the "center of grav-
ity" approach. I° The Indiana Supreme Court first applied this the-
ory, 1 and the New York Court of Appeals soon followed.' 2 The
initial cases analyzed under the "center of gravity" theory were con-
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2 (1971) [hereinafter RESTATE-
MENT 2D] provides: "Conflict of Laws is that part of the law of each state which determines
what effect is given to the fact that the case may have a significant relationship to more than
one state."
4. Conflict of laws is a diverse subject. In addition to choice of law, the subject matter of
conflicts includes jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of judgments, family law, dece-
dents' estates, and other matters. See Leflar, The Nature of Conflicts Law, 81 COLUM. L. REV.
1080 (1981).
5. See R. LEFLAR, L. MACDOUGAL & R. FELIX, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 8 (4th
ed. 1986) [hereinafter R. LEFLAR].
6. This note will focus on a jurisdictional comparison of current choice of law theories.
For a chronological history of choice of law, see Note, Wallis v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 1 UALR
L.J. 103 (1978).
7. See Kay, Theory into Practice: Choice of Law in the Courts, 34 MERCER L. REV. 521
(1983) (This author wishes to acknowledge the thorough research and analysis contained in
Prof. Kay's article, and commends it to the scholar seeking a greater understanding "in this
mercurial area of the law.").
8. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934).
9. For a discussion of the traditional approach, see infra text accompanying notes 53-57.
States following the traditional approach include Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia,
Kansas, Maryland, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. The District of Columbia also fol-
lows this approach. See Kay, supra note 7, at 582-84 & n.376.
10. See Kay, supra note 7, at 525-38.
11. Id. at 526-27 (citing W.H. Barber Co. v. Hughes, 223 Ind. 570, 63 N.E.2d 417 (1945)).
12. Id. at 527 (citing Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954)).
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tract cases, but the New York court was quick to apply the theory to
tort cases. 3
The "center of gravity" approach is based on a counting of the
"contacts" each state has with the case.' 4 No standard exists for de-
termining what constitutes a contact.'" Virtually any factor related to
the case may be considered a contact." After the court counts the
contacts, the law of the state with the greatest number of contacts is
applied to the case.7
Because of its emphasis on the number rather than the quality of
contacts, 8 the center of gravity theory is not popular. Other than
New York, North Dakota stands as the only state court to adopt the
center of gravity approach exclusively. 9
Professor Brainerd Currie developed the next modern theory to
emerge and named it "governmental interest analysis."2 According
to this theory, when a forum state possesses a legitimate policy inter-
est in the outcome of a case, the court should apply forum law to that
case.2' Currie believed forum law should apply even when the foreign
state has an equally strong interest in applying its own policy. 22 Thus,
under pure governmental interest analysis, courts will always apply
forum law unless the forum state is completely disinterested in apply-
ing its own law.2 3
California was the first state to adopt the governmental interest
13. See, e.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743
(1963).
14. See Haag v. Barnes, 9 N.Y.2d 554, 555, 175 N.E.2d 441, 443, 216 N.Y.S.2d 65, 68-69
(1961) (citing Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 160, 124 N.E.2d 99, 101 (1954)).
15. See Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in New York, 1963 DUKE L.J. 1, 43.
16. See id. at 45-47.
17. See Haag at 560, 175 N.E.2d at 444, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 69.
18. But see R. LEFLAR, supra note 5, § 90, at 265.
19. See Issendorf v. Olson, 194 N.W.2d 750 (N.D. 1972) (where plaintiff was a resident of
North Dakota, the vehicle was registered in North Dakota, and the trip began and was to end
in North Dakota, the contacts with North Dakota were most significant, and North Dakota
law applied). See also Kay, supra note 7, at 535-36.
20. Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J. 171.
See Kay, supra note 7, at 538-39.
21. Currie, supra note 20, at 178. A state's legitimate policy interests include those ex-
pressed in legislative enactments as well as more general concerns, such as the support of
children domiciled within the state.
22. Id. Currie thought it inappropriate for courts to "weigh" the competing interests of
sister states. Such weighing could be avoided by always applying forum law when the forum
state had an interest in the case. Id. at 176.
23. Id. at 178. See also E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 16-19 (1982); Currie,
The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 754 (1963).
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analysis.24 Although several states incorporate pieces of this theory
into their choice of law formula,2 5 New Jersey is the only state to join
California in claiming to use a pure form of governmental interest
analysis.26
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws incorporated the
governmental interest analysis and the center of gravity approach in
an attempt to provide a flexible guide to choice of law problems.2
However, the concept most often associated with the Second Restate-
ment is the "most significant relationship test." '28 Courts following
the Second Restatement apply the law of the state having the most
significant relationship to the issues and the parties.29 In determining
which state has the most significant relationship to a case, the court
must consider contacts as well as policy-related choice of law
principles.3 °
The requirement that courts consider "contacts" is drawn from
the center of gravity theory.31 The Second Restatement differs from
the center of gravity theory by defining exactly what contacts a court
should consider.3 2 Significant contacts include "(a) the place where
the injury occurred, (b) the place where the conduct causing the in-
jury occurred, (c) the domicile, residence, nationality,... and place of
business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if
any, between the parties is centered. '33
Courts do not consider these contacts in isolation but evaluate
them in accordance with articulated choice of law principles.34 The
choice of law principles enumerated in the Second Restatement reflect
a broad range of policy concerns, including those of the governmental
interest analysis.3"
24. Kay, supra note 7, at 540-42. See, e.g., Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d
906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961).
25. See Kay, supra note 7, at 544 & n. 142. These states include Illinois and Washington.
26. Id. at 544-46 (citing Pfau v. Trent Aluminum Co., 55 N.J. 511, 263 A.2d 129 (1970)).
27. See Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 679 (1963).
28. This concept is expressed in the RESTATEMENT 2D, supra note 3, at § 145.
29. See id. See also Ehrenzweig, The "Most Significant Relationship" in the Conflicts Law
of Torts-Law and Reason Versus the Restatement Second, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 700
(1963).
30. RESTATEMENT 2D, supra note 3, at § 145. The policy concerns expressed in the Re-
statement. (Second) include the protection of justified expectations, the basic policies underly-
ing the particular field of law, and predictability and uniformity of result. Id. § 6.
31. See supra text accompanying notes 10-19.
32. See RESTATEMENT 2D, supra note 3, at § 145.
33. Id.
34. Id. § 145(1) comment.
35. Id.
[Vol. 10:511
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Fourteen states either expressly or implicitly follow the Second
Restatement in choice of law cases.36 One reason for the relative pop-
ularity of the Second Restatement is that it "includes most of the sub-
stance of all the modem thinking on choice of law."' 37  A modem
theory which particularly influenced the Second Restatement is Pro-
fessor Robert A. Leflar's concept of "choice-influencing
considerations." 38
Professor Leflar introduced choice-influencing considerations in
1966.39 Although other scholars developed lists of factors considered
important in choice of law," Leflar recognized the need to reduce the
number of factors to a manageable size so that courts could use them
in deciding cases. 41 The five considerations Leflar developed are:
1. Predictability of results.
2. Maintenance of interstate and international order.
3. Simplification of the judicial task.
4. Advancement of the forum's governmental interest.
5. Application of the better rule of law.42
Leflar did not intend that any consideration should have priority
over another.43 However, the relevance of each consideration varies
according to the type of case involved." For example, the first three
considerations generally have little bearing on choice of law in torts
cases.45 In contracts cases, however, the first consideration is of pri-
36. See Kay, supra note 7, at 556 & nn.223-24. These states are: Arizona, Colorado,
Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, Ver-
mont, and Washington.
37. R. LEFLAR, supra note 5, § 139 at 391.
38. See Kay, supra note 7, at 562-63.
39. Id. See Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV.
267 (1966) [hereinafter Leflar]; Leflar, Conflicts Law.- More on Choice-Influencing Considera-
tions, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1584 (1966) [hereinafter Leflar, More].
40. R. LEFLAR, supra note 5, § 96 at 193-94. See, e.g., Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the
Applicable Law, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 959 (1952); Yntema, The Objectives of Private Interna-
tional Law, 35 CAN. B. REV. 721 (1957).
41. See Leflar, More, supra note 39, at 1585.
42. Id. at 1586-87.
43. See Leflar, supra note 39, at 282.
44. Id.
45. Kay, supra note 7, at 569. See, e.g., Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 170, 203
N.W.2d 408, 416-17 (1973) (simplification of the judicial task is of little concern because courts
are capable of administering the law of another forum when necessary); Clark v. Clark, 107
N.H. 351, 354, 222 A.2d 205, 209 (1966) (maintenance of interstate orderliness is not a prob-
lem in an automobile accident case because neither interstate travel nor the sensibilities of
either state will be affected by the choice of either state's law); Conklin v. Homer, 38 Wis.2d
468, 477-82, 157 N.W.2d 579, 583-85 (1968) (the choice-influencing consideration of predict-
ability is minimal because parties do not plan to commit torts).
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mary importance.46
New Hampshire was the first state to adopt choice-influencing
considerations.47 Wisconsin48 and Minnesota49 also adopted Leflar's
theory. Other states combine the Leflar approach with other modern
theories.5 ° The combination of the various modem theories is so pop-
ular that Professor Leflar terms it the "new law" of choice of law. 1
At one time Arkansas courts followed the traditional approach
of the First Restatement, termed lex loci delecti (law of the place of
injury). 52 Under lex loci delecti, "[i]f a cause of action . . . is created
at the place of wrong, a cause of action will be recognized in other
states .... If no cause of action is created at the place of wrong, no
recovery . .. can be had in any other state."'5 3
Although lex loci delecti has the advantages of "certainty, ease of
application, and predictability of results,54 its disadvantages include
"mechanical application"55 and harsh results. 6 Finding the disad-
vantages persuasive, the Arkansas Supreme Court took the opportu-
nity presented by Wallis v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co. 57 and abandoned lex
loci delecti in favor of the more flexible approach provided by Leflar's
theory and the Second Restatement.58
In Wallis Arkansas residents brought suit in Arkansas for inju-
ries suffered in Missouri. Lex loci delecti required the application of
46. R. LEFLAR, supra note 5, § 103 at 290-92. Predictability of results is important in
contract cases because parties to the contract should be able to predict the legal consequences
of the contract. When legal consequences depend upon where the litigation occurs, forum
shopping may result.
47. Kay, supra note 7, at 564. See Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966).
48. Kay, supra note 7, at 566. See Heath v. Zellmer, 35 Wis. 2d 578, 151 N.W.2d 664
(1967).
49. Kay, supra note 7, at 566. See Milkovich, 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973).
50. See Kay, supra note 7, at 566-68 & nn.296-302. These states include Arkansas, Mis-
sissippi, Rhode Island, and Hawaii. Id. at 568.
51. See R. LEFLAR, supra note 5, § 109 at 303-05. The application of this blended "new
law" results in consistent judicial opinions regardless of which theory is expressly relied upon
to reach a given result.
52. See McGinty v. Ballentine Produce, Inc., 241 Ark. 533, 408 S.W.2d 891 (1966). See
also Hogue, Arkansas' New Choice of Law Rule for Interstate Torts: A Critique of Wallis,
Williams, and the "Better Rule of Law," 1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 713, 714.
53. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 384 (1934).
54. See Wallis v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 261 Ark. 622, 627, 550 S.W.2d 453, 455 (1977).
55. See, e.g., id. at 627, 550 S.W.2d at 456.
56. See, e.g., Logan v. Missouri Valley Bridge & Iron Co., 157 Ark. 528, 249 S.W. 21
(1923) (Arkansas plaintiff injured while working for an Arkansas corporation on an Arkansas
contract to build a bridge suffered dismissal of tort claim because the injury occurred past
midstream).
57. 261 Ark. 622, 628, 550 S.W.2d 453, 456 (1977).
58. Id. at 627-28, 550 S.W.2d at 456.
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Missouri law, but under Missouri law the plaintiffs could not re-
cover; 9 however, Arkansas law would permit a limited recovery.'
By discarding lex loci delecti and adopting the flexible approach of-
fered by Leflar's theory and the Second Restatement, the Arkansas
Supreme Court could justify applying Arkansas law to the case.6'
Less than one year after the Wallis decision, the Arkansas
Supreme Court again confronted choice of law issues in Williams v.
Carr .62 Williams involved two Tennessee residents killed when a trac-
tor-trailer crossed the median on an Arkansas highway and struck
them while they were standing on the highway discussing a prior acci-
dent with the police. The driver of the tractor-trailer was also a Ten-
nessee resident. The decedents' personal representative instituted a
wrongful death action in an Arkansas circuit court against the trac-
tor-trailer driver's Tennessee employer. The trial court applied Ar-
kansas law, and the jury found plaintiff and defendant equally at fault,
thus barring recovery. 63 On appeal, the plaintiff argued that Tennes-
see law should apply.'
The Arkansas Supreme Court cited Wallis for the proposition
that Arkansas "courts are free to apply the rule based on the 'most
significant relationship' as affected by the ... choice-influencing con-
siderations .... "65 The court then held that the trial court commit-
ted error in not applying Tennessee's substantive law on the measure
of damages for wrongful death.66
59. Missouri's contributory negligence doctrine bars a negligent plaintiff from relief. Id.
at 627, 550 S.W.2d at 455 (citing Chandler v. Mattox, 544 S.W.2d 85 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976)).
But see Hogue, supra note 52. Hogue's analysis indicates that Missouri's "humanitarian doc-
trine" could have allowed recovery in spite of the plaintiff's contributory negligence. Id. at
719-22.
60. 261 Ark. at 627, 550 S.W.2d at 455-56. Arkansas' comparative fault law permits a
plaintiff to receive reduced damages where the negligence of the defendant exceeds that of the
plaintiff. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-64-122 (1987).
61. See 261 Ark. at 632-33, 550 S.W.2d at 458-59 (1977).
62. 263 Ark. 326, 565 S.W.2d 400 (1978).
63. Id. at 328, 565 S.W.2d at 401.
64. Id. at 330, 565 S.W.2d at 402. See infra note 66.
65. 263 Ark. at 333, 565 S.W.2d at 403-04.
66. Id. at 333, 565 S.W.2d at 404. The result in Williams is confusing because the appli-
cation of Tennessee's substantive law could lead to an unfavorable result for the plaintiff. Ten-
nessee follows the common law standard of contributory negligence. See Hogue, supra note 52
at 728 & n.92. Thus, if a jury found any negligence on the part of the plaintiff's decedents, all
recovery would be denied. Arkansas' comparative negligence law appears more favorable to
the plaintiff. However, the plaintiff wanted Tennessee's law on the measure of damages. When
the court held that Tennessee's substantive law applied, the plaintiff became vulnerable to the
effects of Tennessee's contributory negligence law as well.
The Williams plaintiff was protected from the potentially detrimental effect of Tennessee's
contributory negligence law by the Arkansas Supreme Court's holding that the plaintiff's dece-
1987-88]
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After Wallis and Williams it appeared certain that Arkansas
courts would evaluate choice of law questions by using a combination
of the Second Restatement's "most significant relationship" test and
Professor Leflar's choice-influencing considerations. The Arkansas
Supreme Court dispelled that appearance of certainty in the most re-
cent choice of law case, Schlemmer v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. 67
In Schlemmer the Arkansas court relied exclusively on the Leflar
choice-influencing considerations in reaching the decision that Ten-
nessee law should apply. 6s The majority opinion, authored by Justice
Dudley, listed the five considerations and applied each one to the
facts.
In examining the predictability-of-results consideration, the
court found that while this consideration usually has no bearing on
accident cases because the injury is unplanned, it does have limited
applicability in this case. 69 Because the plaintiff was a resident of
Tennessee and the defendant insurance company issued its policy in
Tennessee, the court reasoned that the insurance company based the
premium calculation upon casualty experience under the liability laws
of Tennessee.70 Therefore, "Tennessee law [was] the most relevant
under this consideration."'"
The court found that the choice of either law would not affect
free highway traffic between the states, nor would it affect either
state's concern with its sovereignty.7" Thus, the court favored neither
state's law under the consideration of maintenance of interstate and
international order.
dents were not guilty of negligence which was a proximate cause of their death. 263 Ark. 326,
331, 565 S.W.2d 400, 403. The dissent took issue with this holding, saying that "the defend-
ants are being deprived of the complete defense of contributory negligence under [Tennessee's]
law." Id. at 337, 565 S.W.2d at 405.
One avenue of support for the majority's holding that the decedents were free of negli-
gence can be found in Arkansas' rules of the road. Arkansas' rules of the road were applicable
in this case. Id. at 333, 565 S.W.2d at 404. Arkansas' rules of the road provide, in pertinent
part, "no person shall stop, stand, or park a vehicle, except when necessary to avoid conflict
with other traffic or in compliance with the directions of a police officer .... ARK. CODE
ANN. § 27-51-1302 (1987). Since the plaintiff's decedents were following the instructions of
the Arkansas State Police at the time they were struck, 263 Ark. at 331, 565 S.W.2d at 403,
they were in compliance with Arkansas' rules of the road. Although the majority did not
expressly rely on this reasoning in reaching the Williams result, the Arkansas rules of the road
do provide logical support for the holding.
67. 292 Ark. 344, 730 S.W.2d 217 (1987).
68. Id. at 346-48, 730 S.W.2d at 219.
69. Id. at 346-48, 730 S.W.2d at 219.
70. Id. at 346-47, 730 S.W.2d at 219.
71. Id. at 347, 730 S.W.2d at 219.
72. Id.
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Next the court examined the consideration of simplification of
the judicial task. Tennessee does not have a guest statute. 3 Although
Arkansas had a guest statute at the time of this accident,74 the Arkan-
sas legislature repealed the statute in 1983.71 Therefore, Arkansas
courts were accustomed either to applying the guest statute or not
applying it, based solely on when the accident occurred. The court
concluded that neither state's law is favored under this
consideration. 6
In considering advancement of the forum's governmental inter-
est, the court found that because the Arkansas legislature expressly
repealed the guest statute, Arkansas' policy is now against application
of the guest statute.7" Therefore, Tennessee law, since it contains no
guest statute, would effectuate Arkansas' current policy and is more
relevant under this consideration. 8
Finally, the court analyzed the application of the better rule of
law. The majority stated that, "[tihere is no doubt about which law
we regard as the better law. The Arkansas guest statute in effect at
the time of this accident was archaic and unfair."' 79 The opinion
quoted with favor Professor Leflar's observation that "[c]ourts some-
times realize that certain of their own laws, especially statutory ones,
are archaic, anachronistic, [and] out of keeping with the times."8 "
The court then decided that, "[u]nder this consideration, Tennessee's
law is the better law."8" The majority concluded that the five choice-
influencing considerations dictated that "Tennessee law should be ap-
plied to the tort phase of this case."8 2
Justice Hickman, in dissent, disagreed with the assertion that
Tennessee had the better law "simply because [Arkansas] had the
guest statute."8 3 Justice Hickman noted that the Arkansas Supreme
Court upheld the guest statute repeatedly until the legislature re-
pealed it. He also noted that the statute prevented law suits between
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Act of February 2, 1983, No. 13, 1983 Ark. Acts 44.
76. 292 Ark. at 347, 730 S.W.2d at 219 (1987).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. (quoting Leflar, Conflict of Laws: Arkansas-The Choice-Influencing Considera-
tions, 28 ARK. L. REV. 199, 215 (1974)).
81. 292 Ark. at 348, 730 S.W.2d at 219 (1987).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 348, 730 S.W.2d at 220 (Hickman, J., dissenting).
1987-88] 519
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friends.84 In Justice Hickman's view, because "[t]he accident oc-
curred in Arkansas in an Arkansas vehicle driven by an Arkansas
resident," Arkansas law should apply.85
Justice Hays also dissented.86 He believed that "[w]hen a resi-
dent of another state comes to Arkansas, enters an Arkansas based
vehicle, owned and operated by an Arkansas resident, for a trip
wholly local in character . . ." then Arkansas law should govern."
The dissenters in Schlemmer are applying the "most significant
relationship" test of the Second Restatement, 8 although they do not
call it by name. In the two choice of law cases prior to Schlemmer,89
the Arkansas Supreme Court expressly combined the Second Restate-
ment approach with the Leflar choice-influencing considerations.
However, in Schlemmer the majority makes no mention of the Second
Restatement and does not purport to apply its test. This omission
signals the abandonment of the Second Restatement in favor of exclu-
sive reliance on Leflar's choice-influencing considerations.9"
Had the majority followed the Second Restatement, the result in
Schlemmer might have been different. The dissenters' analysis of the
contacts each state had to the case indicated that Arkansas had the
most significant relationship to the facts.9 1 Therefore, a Restatement
analysis could favor the application of Arkansas law. The majority's
failure to mention the Second Restatement may have reflected an un-
willingness to apply a disfavored Arkansas law. The choice-influenc-
ing considerations gave the court sufficient flexibility to reach what it
saw as a better result.
The Schlemmer decision is of particular interest because of the
majority's heavy emphasis on the last choice-influencing considera-
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. (Hayes, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 349, 730 S.W.2d at 220.
88. See supra note 32. By examining the various connections Arkansas has to the case,
the dissenters are focusing on the "contacts" component of the Second Restatement.
89. Wallis v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 261 Ark. 622, 550 S.W.2d 453 (1977); Williams v.
Carr, 263 Ark. 326, 565 S.W.2d 400 (1978).
90. The majority does not examine the "contacts" of each state to the case as required by
the Second Restatement. See RESTATEMENT 2D, supra note 3, at § 145 & § 145(2) comment.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 84-86. However, the Second Restatement test is
flexible enough to allow the conclusion that Tennessee had the most significant relationship to
the case. This dispute was essentially between a Tennessee resident and a Tennessee insurer.
One could conclude that Tennessee's relationship to the case outweighed the contacts Arkan-
sas had to the case. Had the majority viewed the case in this way, the result under a Second
Restatement analysis would have been the same as that reached using the choice-influencing
considerations.
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tion-the "better rule" of law. Leflar recognized that the "better
rule" consideration was "the most controversial" component of his
theory.92 A potent criticism of the "better rule" approach is that it
usurps the prerogative of the forum's legislature.93
Many judges and commentators believe questions of policy be-
long to the legislature. 94 These commentators believe the solution to
laws which no longer accurately reflect a state's policy is legislative
change. 95 However, when outdated laws remain in effect, the current
policy interests of the community may argue against enforcing the old
law. 96 In a choice of law situation, a court will probably prefer the
law that better reflects current needs and interests.97
When a particular law is a "drag on the coat tails of civiliza-
tion," 98 it is desirable that a court exercise an available option99 to
apply a "better law." However, everyone will not perceive "newer"
law as "better" law, 'I as Justice Hickman pointed out in his Schlem-
mer dissent. 1° 1 It is this lack of consensus as to what constitutes the
"better law" that leads some to suggest that the decision is best left to
a state legislature. 102
One answer to this criticism is that the "better law" considera-
tion does not stand alone. 1 3 Leflar's theory requires that a court
evaluate all of the choice-influencing considerations in the process of
determining which law to apply." According to Leflar, the "better
law" consideration is more properly viewed as a vehicle for allowing
judges to openly identify a primary factor in many decisions, albeit
92. Leflar, More, supra note 39, at 1587.
93. See, e.g., Fuerste v. Bemis, 156 N.W.2d 831 (Iowa 1968).
94. See Fuerste, 156 N.W.2d at 834 (Iowa 1968); Weinberg, On Departing from Forum
Law, 35 MERCER L. REV. 595 (1984).
95. See Weinberg, supra note 94.
96. See R. LEFLAR, supra note 5, § 107, at 298-99.
97. Id. § 107, at 299.
98. Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 959, 980
(1952).
99. The option to apply a "better law" will not become available unless the state possess-
ing the "better law" has sufficient contacts with a case to justify the application of its law.
Federal constitutional requirements thus protect against the possibility that a court might arbi-
trarily choose to apply the law of a state with no relationship to the case. See R. LEFLAR,
supra note 5, § 55, at 164.
100. One example of a potentially controversial "newer" law is a statute which places a
ceiling on medical malpractice awards.
101. 292 Ark. 344, 348, 730 S.W.2d 217, 220 (1987) (Hickman, J., dissenting).
102. See Fuerste v. Bemis, 156 N.W.2d 831 (Iowa 1968).
103. See Leflar, supra note 80, at 204.
104. Id.
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one that often goes unexpressed. °5 Because Leflar's theory encour-
ages a frank identification of the factors underlying a choice of law
decision, its adoption is a positive development in Arkansas law.
Carmen L. Arick
105. See Leflar, More, supra note 39, at 1588.
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